

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET INVASION AND U.S. RESPONSE

(ARCHIVED--03/25/82)

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB80006

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DATE ORIGINATED 01/10/80

DATE UPDATED 02/16/82

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700

0325

## ISSUE DEFINITION

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has had a direct impact on specific U.S. interests in Southwest Asia and seems likely to continue to have an important influence on overall American foreign policy in the 1980s. While disagreement remains about the motives of the invasion, the fact of the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is perceived in the United States and elsewhere as threatening to the security of the oil-rich Persian Gulf region and as a dangerous precedent regarding Soviet willingness to engage its vast military power beyond its borders. The readjustment of U.S. strategy and security policy in the region that began during the Carter Administration, has now acquired more definite shape under the Reagan Administration. It excludes the restoration of U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan, expanded aid and arms sales to the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, and a buildup of the air and naval facility at Diego Garcia and expanded access to shore-based facilities along the Indian Ocean littoral.

In Afghanistan itself, the struggle continues much as it has since the emergence of a full-fledged guerrilla war against Soviet and Afghan government forces. More than two years after the Soviet occupation, there seems little prospect of any major change in the situation -- Soviet control of the principal cities while the guerrillas move with relative freedom in the countryside.

The Soviet occupation continues to be strongly disapproved of by the vast majority of the world community, including the United Nations General Assembly, the Islamic Conference, and the European Parliament, which recently declared Mar. 21, 1982, the Afghan New Year, as "Afghanistan Day."

Questions remain about the most appropriate response for the United States. These include some remaining disagreement about the precise nature of the threat posed to U.S. interests in the region, whether and to what extent the U.S. should support opposition Afghan forces, and the feasibility of a political solution that would involve the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the reestablishment of Afghanistan's freedom, independence, and nonalignment.

## BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

### **AFGHANISTAN: BASIC FACTS AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION**

Afghanistan is a landlocked, arid, and economically backward country of mountains, deserts, and river valleys located in southern Central Asia at the confluence of the Middle East and the South Asian subcontinent. About the size of Texas, it shares boundaries with the Soviet Union to the north, Iran to the southwest, and Pakistan to the east. It also has a very short border with China in the remote Hindu Kush range to the northeast.

Tribally based ethnic diversity gives Afghanistan much of its unique character. Its 14-17 million people (no accurate census has ever been made) are predominantly rural and earn their livelihood through farming, herding, and frequently smuggling across vast porous borders with Iran and Pakistan. The population is overwhelmingly Muslim in religion. Like Pakistan and unlike predominantly Shi'a Iran, most Afghans belong to the majority Sunni sect of Islam. Although most Afghans are devout believers, Islamic orthodoxy rests lightly on many of them.

Historically, Afghanistan has been uncomfortably situated between larger powers. The British invaded it twice during the 19th century as their empire in India expanded westward and when they sought to halt the spread of Russian influence southward into Persia and Central Asia. In the first Afghan war (1838-42), the British and Indian troops that had occupied Kabul and other cities were annihilated during a retreat toward the Khyber pass. In 1879, following a second Anglo-Afghan war, the British government of India gained control over Afghanistan's foreign relations. Afghanistan thereafter served as a buffer between Tsarist Russia (and later the Soviet Union) and the British Empire.

A third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 brought an end to the British overlordship of Afghanistan and signalled the onset of a period of fragile independence and relative neutrality under a succession of Afghan monarchs of the Durrani tribe down to the early 1970s.

#### The Afghan Republic

In 1973 the last king was deposed by his cousin, former premier Mohammad Daoud, who led a relatively bloodless coup and established himself as leader of the first Afghan republic. Although initial concerns that Daoud's coup represented a Communist takeover proved wrong, Soviet influence grew appreciably. In light of subsequent events, some experts on Afghanistan now see Daoud as a "bridge" for the Soviets during a period when their own partisans lacked sufficient political strength to dominate the government.

Under Daoud, Afghanistan continued to pursue the Soviet-leaning neutralist foreign policy followed since the mid-1950s. This policy tacitly -- if warily -- acknowledged the dominant influence of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remained independent and pursued its own generally ineffectual socioeconomic policies domestically. Moreover, it accepted economic assistance from and maintained relations with most other countries. The United States maintained sizable AID and Peace Corps programs there for many years prior to 1978. Total U.S. economic assistance, FY46-78, was \$504.2 million, of which 80% was grant aid. The Soviet Union, however, provided more visible economic and development assistance than other governments, especially after 1973, and played a major role in the training and equipping of Afghanistan's armed forces. The Soviet Union has had a major interest in developing and exploiting Afghanistan's natural gas and mineral resources.

The Daoud regime, never more than nominally socialist, began in 1976 to move increasingly to the right in both domestic and foreign policy. The Soviet Union viewed with growing displeasure the Shah of Iran's attempts to draw Afghanistan into a Western-oriented, Tehran-centered regional economic and security sphere. It was during this 1974-78 period that the Soviets took a new interest in Afghan Communist affairs, and in encouraging the growth of a unified party. The two Afghan Communist factions merged to form a single

Communist "People's Democratic Party" in 1977.

### The 1978 "Saur" (April) Revolution

On Apr. 27, 1978, Deputy Air Force Commander Maj.Gen. Abdul Qader, a leading figure in Daoud's 1973 coup, led a bloody and apparently hastily organized coup that toppled the government and resulted in the killing of Daoud and a number of his family. The coup is believed to have been prompted by the assassination of a prominent leader of the Parcham ("Banner") faction of Afghanistan's divided Communist movement, and the arrest of a number of leaders including Babrak Karmal, another Parchamite leader, and Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizulla Amin, leaders of the rival Khalq ("Masses") faction.

The coup included some hard fighting between forces loyal to Daoud and the leftist forces led by commanders belonging to the Khalq faction. The Air Force, under Maj. Gen. Kader, proved decisive in preventing the relief of the besieged presidential palace.

Two weeks later a new revolutionary council named Nur Mohammad Taraki as its chairman and announced the establishment of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," with Taraki as Prime Minister and Parcham faction leader Babrak Karmal as his deputy. Taraki had been Cultural Officer in the Afghan Embassy, Washington, from 1952-53; and had served with the USAID in Kabul from 1962-63. He had subsequently become Secretary-General of the Khalq faction of the Communist Party.

The installation of an Afghan Communist regime under Taraki was perhaps premature under the circumstances. The split in the Communist movement between the Khalq faction under Taraki and the Parcham faction led by Babrak Karmal and generally considered to be more doctrinaire Marxist, more pro-Soviet, and less nationalistic than the Khalquis, had not been significantly reduced by their earlier merger. Within a few weeks of the coup, the Taraki faction was able to dominate the government and "exile" a number of Parcham leaders, including Karmal, to ambassadorships abroad. A purge in August-October 1978 resulted in the removal of a number of Parcham leaders from any public office, and many, including Babrak Karmal (then Afghan envoy to Czechoslovakia), elected to remain in Eastern Europe as "private citizens."

The Taraki regime soon set about initiating a series of changes by decree that flew in the face of conservative Afghan tradition. These included the elimination of rural usury, equal rights for women, and new regulations on dowries, marriage, and land reform, which was probably intended to be a prelude to Soviet-style collectivism. These efforts generated a severe backlash and fueled the growth of a nationalist-Muslim guerrilla movement in the countryside.

### U.S. Relations with the Taraki Amin Government

In the meantime, U.S.-Afghan relations, which had been relatively cordial before the overthrow of King Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973, and which continued to be correct during the Daoud regime, had grown increasingly strained. The Carter Administration continued U.S. bilateral assistance to Afghanistan, although there was some sentiment in Congress for terminating such programs under the terms of section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L.

87-195), which prohibited assistance to "any Communist country." In fact, the Administration consciously had refrained from labeling the Taraki regime as Communist, both publicly and in its internal analyses of the political situation, in order to avoid triggering the response mandated under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The kidnapping and subsequent killing of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in a shootout between his captors and government security forces at a Kabul hotel on Feb. 14, 1979, cast a pall on already worsening U.S.-Afghan relations because of unresolved questions about the Afghanistan government's role in the affair and its subsequent uncooperativeness. The identity and purposes of Ambassador Dubs' captors is still uncertain. Soviet security advisers appeared to be directing the operation, and the Afghan government disregarded U.S. suggestions that an attempt to rescue Dubs by force be delayed. Subsequently, U.S. economic assistance was phased out, the Peace Corps removed, and the size of the U.S. Embassy staff reduced.

Although the Carter Administration had announced a sharp cutback in aid following the death of Ambassador Dubs, it was not totally halted until Aug. 14, when the President signed P.L. 96-53, the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, into law. Section 505 of the Act prohibited any further assistance to Afghanistan unless the President certified to Congress that the Afghan government had officially apologized and assumed responsibility for the death of Ambassador Dubs and agreed to provide "adequate protection" for all U.S. government personnel in Afghanistan. The President did have the option of overriding this prohibition if he were to determine it was in the national interest because of "substantially changed circumstances." As it turned out, circumstances changed for the worse, and the U.S. has never restored economic assistance or appointed another ambassador.

### Leadership Struggles and Rebellion

Taraki was displaced as Prime Minister in late March 1979, without violence, by his ambitious foreign minister, American-educated Khalq leader Hafizullah Amin. Taraki retained the Presidency. Amin, as Prime Minister, relentlessly pursued the same iconoclastic domestic policies, and major uprisings began to occur in the Pashtun tribal area of eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. Sporadic revolts, largely uncoordinated, spread to all the country's 29 provinces.

Tension persisted within the government between Prime Minister Amin and a faction led by President Taraki, while the guerrilla campaigns continued and government programs floundered. The conflict came to a head in September shortly after Taraki's return via Moscow from the non-aligned conference in Havana. Apparently, Taraki had agreed to a Soviet plan that he oust the strong-willed Amin, who had rejected Soviet urging that he broaden the base of the party and at least temporarily halt the collectivists policies that were enraging conservative rural Afghans. It is thought by some American specialists that Amin also refused Moscow's proposal that Soviet combat forces be introduced to put down the tribal rebellions.

The ouster of Amin was forestalled, apparently, when Taraki was killed by forces loyal to Amin in a shootout at the presidential palace on Sept. 14 or 15. During the three months following the death of Taraki, the internal security situation continued to worsen. By early December, only Kabul, the capital, and five other major urban centers were firmly controlled by

government forces. The largely conscripted Afghan army had been weakened by rebellion, desertions, and purges of its senior ranks. Many units, complete with Soviet-supplied weapons, had gone over to the rebels with whom they sympathized. Over 4,000 Soviet military advisers had been assigned to the army down to the battalion level; Soviet civilian technicians were also helping to run the government.

### The Soviet Role and Invasion

Russian interest in Afghanistan predates Soviet history, reflecting both geopolitical factors and the ethnic ties between the Afghans and the people of Soviet Central Asia. Since Tsarist times, Russia has been a competitor for influence in this traditionally neutral buffer along its southern border.

The creation of the Soviet state in 1917 marked the beginning of a closer relationship between the two countries. The suppression by Moscow of the Muslim population in Soviet Central Asia led Afghanistan to distance itself from the Soviet Union in the 1930s. By the 1950s, relations had begun to improve, although until 1978 Afghanistan remained essentially a neutral buffer state.

Even before the April 1978 coup which ousted President Daoud, the Soviet Union had become Afghanistan's major trading partner and its primary source of economic and military assistance.

While there is no clear evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the April 1978 coup which installed Nur Mohammad Taraki, there is little doubt of Soviet support. The Soviet Union had become increasingly concerned by President Daoud's apparent shift to the right in domestic and foreign policy. They were aware of Daoud's plans to seek larger scale U.S. aid during a planned official visit to Washington in September 1978 and also resented his dismissal of a number of Soviet-trained military officers and his public denunciation of Cuba's self-proclaimed non-aligned status. They also viewed with displeasure the reversal of Daoud's 1974-76 policy of assigning Soviet military advisers down to the company level.

The new government, while not completely in the mold of a Soviet puppet regime, provided a definite pro-Soviet tilt to Afghan domestic and foreign policies. A 20-year bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty was signed on Dec. 5, 1978. It contained more specific language regarding military and security cooperation than is usually found in similar Soviet treaties. During 1978, the number of Soviet technicians and military advisors more than quadrupled.

As resistance to the government's Marxist program mounted, the Taraki-Amin government became increasingly dependent on Soviet assistance in fighting the rebels. Visits to Kabul by high-level Soviet military delegations in April and August of 1979 signaled a more direct Soviet military involvement in the Afghan government's fight against rebel forces.

At the same time, Soviet leaders almost certainly were apprehensive over the Taraki-Amin leadership's moves to eliminate Parcham leaders in the summer of 1978. There were also indications that the Soviet Union had unsuccessfully urged Afghan leaders to broaden the base of the government and to slow their ruthless modernization program in order to quell the growing insurrection. When the more recalcitrant and unpredictable Hafizullah Amin assumed full control of the government in September 1979, Western analysts

generally assumed that Amin's action had Soviet support and signaled a Soviet decision against seeking accommodation with Islamic nationalists and an all-out effort instead to crush the rebellion. Subsequent analyses concluded that during Taraki's visit to Moscow immediately prior to his ouster and death, Soviet leaders had in fact advised him to remove Amin, but that the effort backfired.

The Soviet Union, nonetheless, publicly backed Amin after he took over and stepped up its aid to the government's campaign to crush the rebellion. Despite Soviet support, Amin appeared to be losing ground against rebel forces. A large Soviet military delegation headed by a Deputy Defense Minister, General Ivan Pavlovsky, had been in Afghanistan from August through October to assess the insurgency and devise a plan to cope with it. U.S. officials say that Pavlovsky delivered a grim report on his return home, and that this assessment undoubtedly was a major factor in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December.

The first public sign of Soviet displeasure with Amin and growing concern for its substantial investment in Afghanistan appeared in Pravda on Dec. 7, 1979. The paper carried a message from Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin on the anniversary of the signing of the bilateral friendship treaty. The Soviet greeting to the Amin government was correct but cooler than past Soviet messages. It did not contain the usual assurances of continued Soviet aid and support for the government, although Soviet support was reaffirmed in lower level Soviet media commentary.

By early December, while the Iran crisis was dominating public and media attention, the U.S. Administration was concerned over signs that the Soviet Union might be preparing to escalate its military presence in Afghanistan, as evidenced by a major buildup of Soviet forces along the Afghan border. On Dec. 8 and 9, a unit of Soviet troops with tanks and heavy armor was airlifted to the Soviet-controlled Bagram air field north of Kabul. This force moved north to eliminate rebel troops along the road between Kabul and the Soviet border (the subsequent invasion route). The U.S. Administration stepped up its warnings to the Soviets against direct intervention, as revealed in a State Department briefing for reporters on Dec. 22.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on Dec. 24 with the airlifting of 5,000 Soviet airborne troops to Kabul. U.S. officials quoted in the press speculate that there was probably one last Soviet attempt on Dec. 24 to persuade President Amin to revise his policies along lines more acceptable to Moscow. The Soviet ambassador reportedly met with Amin that day to urge him once more to permit Soviet combat forces to operate against the rebel forces inside Afghanistan, and pursue less ambitious social and economic policies.

According to the same official U.S. sources, Amin may have sensed danger and then moved in a small armored convoy from the presidential palace in the center of Kabul to Darulaman palace 7 miles to the southwest. On Dec. 27, the day of the coup, elements of a 5,000-man Soviet airborne division made their way from the Kabul airport in armored vehicles across the city to the Darulaman palace. Many were reportedly Soviet Central Asian Tajiks and Uzbeks, members of ethnic groups also represented in Afghanistan. Either during a bloody Soviet assault on the Durulaman Palace or immediately after, Amin and members of his family were slain.

Soon thereafter, although it is not clear exactly when, Amin's arch-rival, Babrak Karmal, and other exiled Parcham leaders were airlifted back to Kabul from Eastern Europe by the Russians. Prior to Karmal's actual return, a

recorded statement by him was broadcast on what appeared to be Radio Kabul, but the source was later determined to be a transmitter in Termez on the Soviet side of the border, using Radio Kabul's assigned frequencies. Karmal declared that the "bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin" had been overthrown. Reportedly, the Karmal announcement came before the assault on the Durulaman Palace had ended.

Within a few days of the invasion and Amin's ouster, Western analysts became convinced that the Soviet military action represented a massive and long-term commitment by the Soviet Union to crush the Muslim rebellion and to ensure an Afghan government favorable to Moscow. By the end of December there were said to be at least 200 Soviet aircraft involved in the campaign. By mid-January 1980, the initial 5,000-man invasion force had mushroomed to an estimated 85,000.

A central issue likely to shape future U.S.-Soviet relations is why the Soviet Union now decided to undertake such an action with its entailed risks and negative repercussions.

Current Western assessments of Soviet objectives follow two conflicting lines, one emphasizing the defensive and reactive nature of the Soviet action, limited to protecting its interests in Afghanistan and forestalling the spread of Islamic revivalism; the other stressing the offensive and opportunistic nature of the move into Afghanistan as an action in support of broader Soviet regional ambitions.

Arguments supporting the defensive or reactive interpretation are based on the view that the Amin government was clearly not effective in its campaign to crush the growing rebellion and gain control of the country. There was a real danger from the Soviet perspective that Amin could fall and be replaced by an anti-Soviet Islamic government. Such an outcome would have meant the loss of the substantial Soviet investment in Afghanistan and would have represented a major setback to the Soviet position in Asia and the Persian Gulf. It could have heightened the Islamic fervor sweeping Iran and other countries of the region, intensifying Soviet fears of Islamic fundamentalism engulfing the approximately 50-million Muslim inhabitants of the Soviet Central Asian Republics.

The arguments for offensive or opportunistic interpretations stress that the Soviet Union found itself facing unique opportunities in a region that has been the target of traditional Soviet ambitions. At a time of unprecedented Soviet military strength and confidence, an exploitable situation of chaos and turmoil reigned in Iran, heightening the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf and Pakistan. Whatever retaliatory action the United States might take in trade or other areas, the Afghan venture was calculated to be worth the price, particularly since prospects for ratification of SALT II were already dim, and NATO had just voted to proceed with the TNF modernization which Moscow had sought so vigorously to thwart. Any loss of good will from Third World countries, according to some analysts, would be more than offset by new respect for Soviet power and Moscow's demonstrated willingness to use it. Success in crushing the Afghan rebels could leave Moscow in a position to take advantage of Iranian instability and Pakistan's weakness to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas at Western expense.



Published reports on the situation in Afghanistan suggest that, as of early 1982, the war remains a standoff with the Soviets entrenched firmly in Kabul and other population centers but with the rebels operating freely in perhaps 75-80% of the countryside.

The health of the guerrilla movement remains a matter of dispute. Some feel that with a modest flow of small arms and some limited quantities of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons the guerrillas can hold out indefinitely and make the Soviets pay a heavy price for their occupation. Others see the eventual collapse of the movement as the refugee exodus and Soviet operations aimed at denying the rebels access to food and supplies take their toll. The main developments thus far are an apparent revitalization of the guerrilla effort in the spring of 1981, including some significant battlefield achievements such as the burning of a major Soviet airbase near Kabul, but a continued inability of Peshawar-based political movements to coalesce around a single leader or collective leadership and program. In the spring of 1981, a major fissure reopened between the more secular constitutionalist-minded groups, notably the National Islamic Front headed by Sayed Ahmed Gailani, and the more fundamentalist groups. Three fundamentalist groups left the umbrella organization Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan and formed a new front with the rival Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

The Peshawar and Quetta based groups generally are not regarded as representative of those carrying on the battlefield effort, who are thought primarily to be tribal groups operating in loose cooperation within their traditional territory. The Peshawar groups do, however, represent various strains of political thinking among the Afghan resistance, and several of them have succeeded in creating effective political and military organizations. Moreover, they are presumably indispensable channels for whatever aid reaches the resistance via Pakistan.

Reportedly, the resistance effort within Afghanistan is largely local and uncoordinated, though many reports speak of widening circles of cooperation and the existence of a sophisticated urban guerrilla movement within Kabul and other cities, with close links to dissident officials in the army and the civil service. The official U.S. position and that of many independent observers is that among the forces fighting in the field, the lack of a recognized national leader and an agreed upon political program is perhaps a strength at this stage of the armed struggle, rather than a weakness. This evaluation does not, however, address the question of the future of the resistance movement and the implications of a continued lack of a coordinated effort. By nearly all accounts the internicine rivalry between the Peshawar based groups has been counterproductive and harmful to the international image of the resistance movement.

The Soviet-backed government in Kabul is no nearer the achievement of its goals, and continues to suffer from internal weaknesses as well as the absence of any widespread popular support. In April 1981, Babrak Karmal indicated that he might step down as Prime Minister in an effort to restructure the government. In mid-May Karmal gave an interview to the leftist Indian magazine Blitz, in which he reportedly said "I became Prime Minister in certain circumstances and much water has flowed down the Kabul river since then." Initial speculation on a successor focused on several figures from the Khalq faction, including Assadullah Sarwari, head of the Afghan secret police during the Amin era, who subsequently went into exile in Mongolia.

After some two months of behind the scenes maneuvering, including reporting shooting incidents between Parcham and Khalq factions, Soltan Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the DRA Council of Ministers, was named to replace Babrak Karmal as prime minister. Keshtmand is a member of the Parcham faction and his selection has been viewed as a victory for Parchamites over the Khalqis, and the failure of the Soviets to engineer a coalescence of the feuding factions. As of the fall of 1981, Babrak Karmal appears to retain Soviet support and continues to be the primary figure in the Afghan government.

Similarly, an effort to create a Fatherland Front, including non-communist and tribal representatives, also appears to have misfired. As a result, the Soviet-backed government is no closer to mobilizing broader national support than before.

Another apparent policy failure of the Soviet-backed government was a September 1981 effort to recall to active duty former soldiers under age 35 who had been discharged prior to Oct. 22, 1978. Reportedly, this effort met with intense popular resistance, including demonstrations by schoolgirls and the flight of eligible males from the urban areas to their native villages. As a consequence of the reaction to the order, the government announced a number of exceptions for teachers, civil servants and other influential or important groups.

Many observers see a long-term strategy to remake the country by training new military and civilian cadres and educating a new generation of Afghans to accept a state molded on Soviet lines and quasi or outright satellite status. At the same time, the rebels also see a prolonged struggle leading up to the formation of an exile government and an escalating guerrilla campaign to convince the Soviets that their position is not worth the cost. At the present time neither side seems to be measurably closer to achieving its objectives.

## INTERNATIONAL REACTION

### United Nations Action

The invasion of Afghanistan put the Soviet Union at odds with the overwhelming majority of the international community, including both Western countries and those of the Third World. On Jan. 14, 1980, just a few weeks after the Soviet invasion, the UN General Assembly passed, by a margin of 104 in favor, 18 against and 18 abstaining, a resolution which "strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan" as inconsistent with a fundamental principle of the UN Charter, and called for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan." The resolution also called for aid to the refugees through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and called upon the Security Council to consider ways and means to assist the implementation of the resolution.

On Nov. 20, 1980, the General Assembly again passed a resolution against the invasion of Afghanistan by an overwhelming margin. The second resolution was slightly weakened in comparison with the previous one, in that it used the phrase "grave concern" instead of "strongly deplores," and deleted reference to the "unconditional" withdrawal of foreign forces. The second resolution also mentioned the situation in Afghanistan in the context of the "colonial legacy," thereby implying Western responsibility as well. The latest

resolution, which was largely the handiwork of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, came under criticism from some Persian Gulf and ASEAN states. Agha Shahi defended the weaker language as necessary to obtain an even larger vote in favor of the resolution than previously. The second resolution passed by a margin of 111 in favor, 22 against, 9 abstentions and 9 absent or not voting.

On Feb. 11, 1981, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed a top UN official, Javier Perez de Cuellar, as his special representative to seek negotiations on a political settlement of the Afghanistan issue in the context of the previous General Assembly resolutions. Javier Perez de Cuellar has had several rounds of talks with the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, thus far without conclusive result. See section below entitled "Possibility of a Political Settlement."

On Nov. 18, 1981, following three days of debate, the UN General Assembly approved for the third time a resolution calling for the removal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan. The vote was 116 in favor, 23 opposed, with 12 nations abstaining. Reportedly, the resolution was chiefly drafted by Pakistan. According to the New York Times of Nov. 19, 1981, the secretary general of Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, S. Shah Nawaz, criticized the Soviet Union for upsetting detente with the United States by its action in Afghanistan and for failing to recognize that the problems of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan stemmed entirely from "the national resistance of the Afghan people to the continuing foreign military intervention." The Pakistani official told the Assembly that "as long as attempts are made to ascribe the resistance to outside instigation, a political solution will remain outside our grasp."

### The Islamic Conference

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan continues to be strongly opposed by most Islamic countries, especially Pakistan and Iran which are the most affected. Only Libya, South Yemen, and Syria have challenged efforts to maintain a broad front against the occupation by the Islamic conference. Even Iraq, which is dependent on Soviet military support in its continuing conflict with Iran, has criticized Soviet policy. Beginning shortly after the Soviet invasion, each successive periodic meeting of the foreign ministers of the Islamic Conference has passed resolutions opposing the Soviet occupation and supporting a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations based on a withdrawal of Soviet forces, the restoration of Afghanistan's non-alignment and territorial integrity, and non-interference in its affairs by outside forces.

On Jan. 28, 1980, an emergency Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers met in Islamabad, Pakistan, and approved a resolution that condemned Soviet military aggression against Afghanistan, demanded the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal" of all Soviet troops, urged "all countries and peoples" to secure the Soviet withdrawal through all possible means, suspended Afghanistan from membership in the Conference, called on member states to withhold recognition of and aid to the Karmal regime, pledged support for Afghanistan's neighbors -- Iran and Pakistan, and called on Muslim countries "to envision" their "nonparticipation" in the Moscow Olympics. The 11th Islamic Conference, which concluded on May 22 in Islamabad, passed a resolution dealing with Afghanistan which represented a substantial softening of the January emergency conference's strong condemnation of the Soviet invasion. The resolution established a

ministerial committee comprising Tunisia, Iran, and Pakistan empowered to open negotiations with all parties involved in Afghanistan, including the Soviet Union. Resolution of the situation would be based on four principles: (1) immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops; (2) recognition of the Afghan people's rights to choose their own form of government and socio-economic system; (3) respect for the independence, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan; and (4) creation of conditions within that country which would enable refugees to return safely.

The Muslim World League and the Islamic Congress have condemned Soviet aggression in Muslim Afghanistan. At the United Nations, five Arab states -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Morocco -- joined Western and other Third World countries in signing a letter requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the Afghanistan situation. Eighteen Middle Eastern countries voted for the Jan. 14 UN General Assembly resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, three abstained and two did not participate. Only the P.D.R.Y. voted against.

At the February 1981 Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference, the representatives of the Islamic countries played a prominent role in insisting on strong language calling for the removal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.

### Iran

Iran was one of the earliest and most outspoken critics of the Soviet invasion. A statement issued by the Iranian government on Dec. 29, 1979, termed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan "a hostile act... against all the Muslims of the world." The Ayatollah Khomeini denounced the former Taraki and Amin regimes for the anti-Islamic tones of their policies and called upon Afghanistan's armed forces, police and civil service to turn against the "corrupt atheists" who were attempting to subvert the country's traditional Islamic culture. In turn, Kabul increasingly accused "prejudicial religious elements" in Iran of having aided Muslim resistance movements in Afghanistan.

Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh, attending the May 1980 Islamic Conference in Islamabad, strongly condemned the Soviet intervention and expressed skepticism over proposed negotiations with the Soviet Union. His delegation included leaders of five Afghan groups resisting the Soviet occupation forces.

At the 1981 Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference in New Delhi, Iran continued to play an active role in opposing any negotiations with the present Kabul government.

### Pakistan

The invasion of Afghanistan caused great distress in Pakistan where there is much concern about the potential for Soviet-inspired and directed subversion of the country. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long border over which they have been at odds for many years. Autonomy-minded tribal groups in the provinces of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier, straddling the boundary, have been a perennial threat to the integrity of Pakistan and a complicating factor in attempts to resolve its disputes with Afghanistan. While negotiations with the previous Afghan regimes met with little or no

success, at least there was the feeling in Pakistan that the contending parties were equally matched. Soviet control of Afghanistan appears to make the country a potentially far more formidable opponent. It is feared that a Soviet-dominated regime will be aggressive in pursuing an active policy of subversion among Pakistan's dissident ethnic groups (especially Baluchis and Pashtuns), thereby raising to a much higher level the possibility of the region's balkanization and an end to Pakistan as it exists today. Having lost the east wing of the country -- Bangladesh -- less than a decade ago, the Pakistanis are particularly sensitive to this prospect. The Pakistan government is also worried that the spillover of Afghan refugees, including anti-Soviet guerrillas, into Pakistan territory might result in direct Soviet military incursions into Pakistan.

The Afghans have periodically encouraged the movement for a new Afghan-dominated country of "Pashtunistan" to be formed from Pakistan's Pashtun-majority area, and including the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. This issue was eclipsed by the Afghan guerrilla war that has been raging since 1978, but the Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul voiced support for the creation of Pashtunistan.

At present, of course, the Soviets and the Kabul regime do not enjoy any esteem among the traditionally disaffected tribal groups in Pakistan. Over the longer term, should the Soviet and Afghan government forces be successful in pacifying the country, they will be well placed geographically if not politically to exploit Pakistan's internal tensions.

For the near term, the far more ominous threat to Pakistan arising out of the situation in Afghanistan is the presence of some 2.3 million refugees in Pakistan's loosely held frontier areas. One of the dangers for Pakistan is that the presence of a large, armed refugee population could result in the de facto creation of Pushtunistan within Pakistan's borders.

Both in its capacity as current chairman of the 40 member Islamic Conference and as a country most deeply affected by the developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan has played a leading role in formulating the Islamic and Third World reaction to the Soviet invasion. Pakistan and its Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi, came under criticism over the wording of a resolution approved by the United Nations General Assembly on Nov. 20, 1980, which called for an immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Reportedly, some Persian Gulf and ASEAN states viewed the resolution as weaker in substance than one passed by the General Assembly in Jan. 1980.

Among other things, the resolution deleted the word "unconditional" from the earlier call for "an immediate and unconditional withdrawal," and substitutes "grave concern" over the intervention instead of the earlier phrase "strongly deplores." The resolution also mentioned the situation in Afghanistan in the context of the "colonial legacy," thus implying Western responsibility as well.

Agha Shahi defended the weakening of the draft as necessary to maintain strong support for the resolution. He maintained that equaling or bettering the previous vote was more important than the substance of the resolution. (The latest resolution received 111 votes in favor and 22 against, with 12 abstentions and 9 absent or not voting, versus 104 in favor, 18 against and 18 abstentions in January 1980.)

More recently, at the February 1981 Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference in New Delhi, Pakistan played a leading role in getting a strong

statement urging the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

Pakistan's attitude towards the Kabul government hardened further as a consequence of the March 1981 hijacking of a Pakistani airliner by members of the anti-government "Al Zulfikar" group, including the execution of a Pakistani diplomat onboard the aircraft following its diversion to Kabul. Pakistan has charged that the Kabul authorities gave aid and comfort to the hijackers, including additional weapons, and that the hijackers were welcomed at the Kabul airport by the son of the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Pakistan's willingness to take a hardline stance against the Soviet Union is said to be enhanced also by strong support from the Reagan Administration, notably the agreement by the administration to provide a \$3.2 billion long term package of economic assistance and military sales credits, including the sale -- partly for cash and partly for credit -- of the advanced F-16 fighter bomber aircraft. See CRS Issue Brief 81122, Arms Sales and Security Assistance to Pakistan.

### India

A basic determinant of Indian policy has been its continued perceived dependency on the Soviet Union for arms at favorable prices and terms and diplomatic support against neighboring Pakistan and China, against whom it has fought past conflicts and who are viewed as continuing military threats. The government of Indira Gandhi has moved away from an initial open acceptance of the Soviet rationale for its invasion of Afghanistan, but the Indian government's criticism of the Soviet Union remains muted and is always coupled with references to other "outside intervention." The Indian Government publicly agrees with the need for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the end to what it sees as other forms of interference in Afghanistan's affairs (i.e., support for the resistance forces via Pakistan), but argues that private diplomacy rather than open pressure is the most suitable means of achieving a Soviet withdrawal. Consequently, the Government of India has sought without much success to prevent the emergence of an anti-Soviet movement among the non-aligned nations. It also has made unilateral approaches to the Soviet Union, seeking Moscow's acceptance of a withdrawal formula. The last such effort, a visit by the Indian Foreign Minister to Moscow in June 1980, ended in apparent failure. Nevertheless, overall Soviet-Indian relations remain close, as the two governments announced on May 28 an agreement for the sale of \$1.6 billion in Soviet weapons to India. The Indian government publicly called for a settlement of the Afghanistan problem based on non-intervention and respect for Afghanistan's integrity and independence during President Brezhnev's December 1980 visit to New Delhi, and declined to commit itself to a Soviet five-point plan for settling issues concerning Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region.

The greatest concern of Indian leaders at this juncture revolves around Pakistan's response to the intervention -- and its possible implications. There is considerable apprehension that because the crisis has led to strengthened ties between Pakistan and the United States, an expected resumption of U.S. deliveries of military equipment. An influx of new and sophisticated U.S. weaponry is seen by the Indian government as having a major destabilizing effect on the current favorable balance of forces between India and Pakistan. The possibility of a closer military relationship between China and Pakistan is also viewed with concern by Indian leaders. After three wars with Pakistan, in which the latter employed weapons supplied

by the United States, and a fourth war with China, India is suspicious of any U.S. military assistance in the region designed to strengthen Pakistan.

Less openly, India is also concerned with the longer term implications of an Islamic fundamentalist movement to oust the Soviets. With 75 million Muslims of its own, and sporadic Hindu-Muslim communal violence and more portentous Muslim clashes with the security forces in sensitive areas like Kashmir, India is less sympathetic to the aspirations of the Afghan insurgents than the neighboring Islamic countries.

From India's perspective, the most advantageous outcome would be the establishment of a secularist, "progressive", Soviet-leaning government such as that of the deposed Daoud regime. In the absence of that, the prospect of a prolonged Soviet occupation appears less ominous than the victory of a rightist Islamic fundamentalist regime or the active involvement of the United States and neighboring Islamic countries in supporting the resistance forces and increasing the polarization in the region.

#### U.S. RESPONSE

##### The Soviet Union

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered a major reassessment of the role of the United States in the world.

Developments in the Middle East and in South Asia in 1979 highlighted U.S. losses and vulnerabilities in the Third World.

The fall of the Shah in early 1979 and the subsequent instability in the Persian Gulf region exposed the vulnerability of the Middle East oil resources vital to the Western world and underscored geopolitical shortcomings of the U.S. retrenchment policy. The seizure of the American hostages in Tehran during the fall of 1979 quickened the pace of an ongoing reversal of U.S. policy.

The invasion of Afghanistan accelerated the process of reversal from retrenchment towards reinforcement of some form of qualified globalism. The invasion appeared to challenge the United States to create a policy based on a new national consensus, one that required the necessary military power to support whatever role it determined to play. The first step towards defining this role was taken in President Carter's State-of-the-Union message of Jan. 24, 1980, when he declared: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Specific U.S. responses to Soviet actions in Afghanistan were announced in President Carter's message to the nation on Jan. 4. The U.S. measures included:

- (1) Blocking grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 8 million metric tons already contracted. This means withholding an additional 17 million metric tons which the Soviets have already ordered.
- (2) Stopping the sale of high technology and strategic items

to the Soviet Union, including computers and oil drilling equipment.

- (3) Curbing Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. The catch allowed Soviet fishing fleets in 1980 would be reduced from 350,000 tons to 75,000 tons, resulting in an estimated Soviet economic loss of \$55 million to \$60 million.
- (4) Delaying the opening of a new Soviet consulate in New York and an American consulate in Kiev.
- (5) Postponing new cultural and economic exchanges between the two countries, now under consideration.
- (6) Boycotting the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow.

These measures received only partial support from U.S. allies and other friendly nations. While there is little doubt that U.S. measures discomfited the Soviet Union, few argue that they had more than symbolic significance, however important. Some measures such as the grain embargo had at best a shaky political constituency in the United States. Largely in response to pressure from domestic agricultural interests and in keeping with a campaign pledge, President Reagan ended the limitation on grain sales on Apr. 24, 1981. The President stated that the action should not be read as a weakening of U.S. opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but simply that the export limitation had unfairly made American farmers bear the brunt of U.S. foreign policy. The President said that he would have taken the action sooner but for the Polish crisis and his desire not to send the "wrong signal" to the Soviet Union.

The readjustment of U.S. regional security strategy that began during the Carter Administration acquired more definite shape under the Reagan Administration.

With regard to the situation in Afghanistan itself, the main elements of the Reagan Administration's policy include the bolstering of Pakistan's security through arms credits and economic assistance, humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, diplomatic support for a political settlement along the lines of United Nations, Islamic Conference and Non-Aligned Conference resolutions, and, reportedly, the provision of some assistance to the Afghan resistance forces.

#### U.S. Regional Options

U.S. ability to influence events in Afghanistan is limited to providing direct or indirect assistance to the Afghan guerrilla forces and refugees, and to supporting the government of President Zia ul Haq in neighboring Pakistan. In both cases, the options would appear to require working through the government of Pakistan, since that country is the only haven of the Afghan insurgents to which the U.S. has access. Opposition forces operate from within both the Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier provinces of Pakistan. Given the state of U.S.-Iranian relations, it seems unlikely that the United States could channel any aid through Iran.

In February 1980 an unidentified American official was quoted in the press as saying that the Carter Administration had begun a covert program of unspecified size to provide arms to the Afghan guerrillas. Subsequent to



that report, little information appeared concerning any U.S. effort to aid the guerrillas, although some sources attributed a U.S. role in a reported shipment of Soviet-made weapons, possibly from Egyptian stocks.

In an article in the New Republic of July 18, 1981, Carl Bernstein described what he claimed was a major U.S.-organized effort to supply arms to the Afghan resistance via China and Pakistan. According to Bernstein, this effort had been organized within a month after the December 1979 Soviet invasion, and had been funded to the extent of "considerably more" than \$30 million by the United States. In all, Bernstein said, the covert aid program involved five countries -- the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- and a cost of more than \$100 million.

Among other things, Bernstein claimed that the aid program had provided the resistance fighters with training (by Egyptians), modern heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles (including Soviet SAM-7s), and anti-tank rockets. Bernstein also claimed that Pakistan had imposed a number of conditions on the amount and manner of delivery of the aid, out of concern about incurring Soviet retaliation, but that these conditions had been eased somewhat recently, a change attributed to Pakistan's being "impressed" with the Reagan Administration's \$3 billion offer of economic assistance and military sales credits.

Subsequent to the publication of this article, persons acquainted with the Afghan resistance movement have expressed incredulity, especially at claims that the guerrillas are receiving any sizeable quantities of SAM-7s or equivalent weapons. Bernstein, however, seemed to partially anticipate this reaction by stating that the resistance continues to be short of arms, but that criticisms of the United States for lack of support are mistaken and based on the fact that the guerrillas themselves are not fully aware of the sources of arms distributed in their camps.

An Aug. 8, 1981, article by Leslie H. Gelb in the New York Times reported that American officials had denied that U.S. weapons were being sent to Afghanistan either directly or indirectly, but that the officials "acknowledged that weapons were being provided principally by China and Egypt, with financing by Saudi Arabia." The officials were also said to have maintained that the most sophisticated weapon being provided to the resistance forces was the Soviet-made RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launcher.

#### U.S. Contributions to Support of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

As of early 1982, there are estimated to be 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan settled in villages in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier province. The Afghan refugee population in Pakistan is said by U.S. sources to be the largest refugee group in the world. (One half million or more Afghan refugees may also be in Iran.)

The cost of supporting the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan has increased steadily and is currently estimated at about \$300 million annually. Pakistan itself assumes a major proportion of this cost. It provides per diem cash allowances to the refugees estimated at about \$80 million annually, and underwrites the cost of distributing external commodity aid. The balance is made up by international contributions, including U.S. aid, through the World Food Program and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

For FY80, the United States contributed \$43.7 million in cash and food

through these agencies, or about one-third of the total for outside aid. During FY81 (as of June 1981), the United States contributed food aid valued at \$28 million, and pledged \$18 million to the UNHCR.

For FY82 the Administration requested \$24.15 million for assistance through international organizations on the basis of an estimate of 2 million Afghan refugees expected to be in Pakistan. The Administration also plans to contribute a yet unspecified amount of food aid under the P.L. 480 program.

#### Possibility of a Politcal Settlement

Calls for a political settlement of the Afghanistan issue go back almost to the invasion itself. The idea of a negotiated settlement was implicit but not directly stated in the UN resolutions of Jan. 14 and Nov. 20, 1980. On Feb. 11, 1981, following discussions at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference in New Delhi, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed a top aid as a special representative to participate in a still unclear way in any future talks between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. The Soviet Union has from time to time indicated approval of talks concerning the "external" aspects of the Afghanistan issue, and has indicated an interest in pursuing the question at the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral level. Afghanistan is eager to enter into talks with Iran and Pakistan as a means of gaining recognition of the legitimacy of the Babrak Karmal regime.

During February 1981, French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing revealed the replies from Soviet President Brezhnev and other heads of state to his own proposal for a negotiated settlement.

The question of a settlement is complicated by differing views as to what should be negotiated. The Western countries and Afghanistan's neighbors in the Islamic world favor a settlement that would involve the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the restoration of the country's independence and nonalignment.

The Soviet Union has indicated very different objectives. First, Moscow seeks the recognition of Kabul by neighboring countries and an end to what it charges is interference in Afghanistan's "internal affairs" by neighboring Iran and Pakistan. Second, the Soviet Union seems interested in a larger objective of blunting the adverse reaction to their occupation of Afghanistan and gaining recognition of Soviet "legitimate interests" in the Persian Gulf region. Thus during his December 1980 address to the Indian Parliament during his visit to New Delhi, Soviet President Brezhnev proposed a five-point plan for dealing with the "dangerous" situation in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region -- i.e., the U.S. naval buildup and U.S. efforts to forge new security ties with the littoral. Subsequently, Soviet spokesman have referred to the possibility of the U.S. and the Soviet Union settling their differences at the superpower level -- presumably on the basis of U.S. recognition of Soviet interests in Afghanistan, abandoning its emerging forward posture in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region and reconizing Soviet interest in the Gulf.

Assuming that despite these differences in objective there exists some minimum common ground, the possibility of a negotiated settlement is limited by factors outside the control of the parties most directly concerned. For instance, assuming that the Soviet Union would be content to withdraw if it could leave behind a reliable client state, what are the possibilities of such a government being created? At present, the possibility is nil due to

the hopeless factional warfare between the ruling Parcham group and the out-of-power Khalq, especially since the Khalq faction reportedly has stronger representation in what remains of the Afghan army and bureaucracy.

Likewise, on the guerrilla side, there seems little prospect that an effective coalescence can take place that could lead to talks with the Babrak Karmal regime or any Soviet-backed successor.

In the course of a June 1981 summit meeting of the heads of government and the foreign ministers of the 10-nation European Economic Community, a British-sponsored plan to seek a settlement of the Afghanistan situation was approved. The plan called for a meeting in the fall of 1981 of representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (United States, U.S.S.R., Britain, France, and China); the Secretary General of the United Nations; the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference; and representatives of Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan, Iran and India. A second phase would involve the participation of "representatives of the Afghan people," a phase that clearly did not necessarily include the current Kabul government.

The EEC proposal was firmly rejected by the Soviets even before a visit to Moscow by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, during which he was to explain the plan. A Washington dispatch by Tass, the Soviet official news agency, denounced it as flawed because the Afghan government would not be included in the initial round of talks and might not be included in the second round. On July 6, following five hours of talks between Lord Carrington and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the latter told a press conference that the EEC proposal was "unrealistic" and that outsiders should "keep their hands off" Afghanistan's internal affairs.

The efforts of the UN Special Representative, Javier Perez de Cuellar, have not produced any positive result, nor did meetings in September 1981 between Secretary General Waldheim and the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan. During August Afghanistan made a seeming concession of sorts by agreeing to include the UN special representative in talks with Pakistan, but this did not resolve the fundamental objection of Pakistan that any talks with Afghanistan not be seen as conceding legitimacy to the Babrak Karmal regime. Thus far Pakistan is only willing to talk with the Afghan leaders through the agency of the United Nations, with the Afghan participants being recognized as party officials rather than government representatives.

The seeming flexibility of both Moscow and Kabul was widely interpreted as primarily being aimed at improving their position in the fall 1981 UN session on Afghanistan, rather than representing any real decision to seek a political settlement.

#### LEGISLATION

H. Con. Res. 129 (McDonald)

Expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should: (1) terminate diplomatic relations with the present regime in Afghanistan; (2) recognize and establish diplomatic relations with a provisional Afghan government; (3) provide assistance to Afghan freedom fighters under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; and (4) provide other assistance to Afghan refugees and freedom fighters as needed. Introduced May 12, 1981; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Crisis in the Subcontinent: Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. An assessment of the Afghanistan sanctions: implications for trade and diplomacy in the 1980s. Report prepared by the Office of Senior Specialists, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. April 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981.

At head of title. 97th Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Restrictions on appointment of an Ambassador to Afghanistan; report to accompany S.Res. 106. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 5 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-127)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 12/27/81 -- Second anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- 12/24/81 -- According to the Washington Post, a U.S. Department of State estimate placed Soviet forces in Afghanistan at 90,000. The report noted that the Afghan resistance was stronger than ever but not sufficiently strong or united to force a Soviet withdrawal. The assessment noted that nearly one of every five Afghans was a refugee.
- 12/16/81 -- The European Parliament passed a resolution declaring Mar. 21, 1982, as "Afghanistan Day."
- 11/18/81 -- The UN General Assembly approved for the third time a resolution calling for the removal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan. The vote, which came after three days of debate, was 116 in favor and 23 opposed to the resolution, with 12 nations abstaining.
- 10/09/81 -- The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that in the course of an Oct. 3-4 meeting of the Islamic Conference foreign ministers, at New York, Secretary General Habib Chatty of Tunisia informed the ministers that the efforts of UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had borne "no progress." Reportedly, Chatty called for "maximum efforts" to again pass a strong condemnatory resolution concerning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

- 10/08/81 -- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in the course of a visit to Pakistan following the Commonwealth Conference in Melbourne, Australia, accompanied President Ziaul Haq to the Afghan frontier at Torkhan, near the Khyber via Afghanistan. Prime Minister Thatcher became the first Western head of government to visit Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- 09/28/81 -- Separate talks between UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan were held but produced no positive movement.
- 09/20/81 -- Sources in Kabul told the BBC that Muslim rebels had launched a rocket attack on the Soviet embassy in the Afghan capital on Sept. 15, destroying a major portion of the commercial wing. Reports were also received of heavy fighting between Muslim rebels and government forces in Kunar province near the Pakistan border. Hong Kong Agence France Presse said that Qandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, had come under Afghan rebel control.
- 09/15/81 -- Pakistan formally accepted a \$3.2 billion, five-year arms sale and economic aid package with the United States after the Reagan Administration, at Pakistan's insistence, agreed to accelerate the separate delivery of F-16 fighter-bombers (40 jet planes in 12 months instead of delivery after a 26-month waiting period).
- 09/08/81 -- Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost returned home following talks with India's Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao. According to the Delhi Domestic Service radio the Indian Foreign Minister stressed that "the flow of arms to Pakistan, increasing militarization of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region, external intervention in Afghanistan in one form or another were all matters which required urgent attention." Rao called for continuing efforts towards a political solution "even if certain countries may consider it advantageous that there should be no move towards a settlement."
- Prime Minister Gandhi is reported to have stressed the same theme during a 30 minute talk with Dost.
- Pakistan lodged a strong protest with Afghanistan over reported violations of its territory by Afghan armed forces, including the bombing and strafing of a militia post and village in Domandi and a sweep of homes in the village of Shabaz Kili.
- Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, in a domestic radio broadcast, said that any move or prospect of talks at the international level seemed to be accompanied by Afghan intrusions into Pakistani

territory, presumably as a show of strength. He reiterated Pakistan's denial of recognition to the regime in Kabul.

- 09/06/81 -- A spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Defense rejected the allegation by Pakistani authorities that Afghan military aircraft had fired on a Pakistani military post. Authorities in Kabul said that such "propaganda" was ill-timed, since Afghanistan had offered "constructive" proposals to normalize relations with Pakistan.
- 08/24/81 -- Moscow and Kabul launched a new peace offensive aimed at forestalling another UN General Assembly debate on Afghanistan, according to a Foreign Broadcast Information Service media analysis, adding new points to the plan proposed in May 1980. For example, Kabul reportedly dropped its objections to tripartite talks with its neighbors, broader UN "participation" in such talks, unofficial consultations regarding guarantees of Afghanistan's security, and free movement of nomads across the Afghan-Pakistani border.
- 08/25/81 -- At a luncheon for Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Firyubin, Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi was reported by Karachi Domestic Service radio to have stated that their talks "had been conducted in a warm and friendly atmosphere" and that "the two countries are committed to peace in the region and in the entire world. On most international issues Pakistan and the Soviet Union have identical or similar views."
- 08/24/81 -- Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Firyubin arrived in Islamabad for four days of talks at the invitation of the Pakistan government.
- 08/15/81 -- The Washington Post reported that Islamic insurgents waging war against Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan had developed a widespread network of supporters within the Afghan army and the Soviet-installed government in Kabul.
- 08/07/81 -- An article by Leslie H. Gelb in the New York Times claimed that the Soviet Union had recently rejected private diplomatic initiatives by the Reagan Administration to begin secret talks on a possible political settlement of the Afghanistan situation. Gelb suggested that the revelation of the initiatives was designed, among other things, to highlight Soviet intransigence and build support for the Administration's position within the United States. Gelb also reported that American officials denied that American weapons were being provided to the Afghan resistance, but "acknowledged that weapons were being provided principally by China and Egypt, with financing by Saudi Arabia."
- 07/23/81 -- A report by Michael T. Kaufman to the New York Times

cited diplomatic reports of a 3-day battle centering around Paghman, near Kabul, which had resulted in some of the most severe fighting since the Soviet invasion. Diplomatic reports attributed a major role to 300 cadets from a Kabul military academy, of whom 200 defected and 100 were killed by the guerrillas. As the battle developed, the guerrillas were said to have been reinforced by partisans from neighboring provinces.

- 07/18/81 -- In an article in The New Republic, Carl Bernstein claimed that since shortly after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States had been involved, along with China, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in a major covert effort to arm the Afghan resistance fighters, totalling more than \$100 million.
- 07/06/81 -- Following five hours of talks between British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, during which the European Economic Community initiative for solving the Afghanistan situation was discussed, Gromyko told a press conference that the EEC proposal was "unrealistic" and that outsiders should "keep their hands off" Afghanistan's internal affairs.
- 06/29/81 -- At the end of a summit meeting of heads of government and foreign minister of the 10-nation European Economic Community, Western European leaders revealed the terms of a British-sponsored EEC proposal for seeking the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The EEC plan calls for a two-stage process for ending all outside interference. The first stage would be a meeting in late October or early November 1981 between the five permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary General, the secretary of the Islamic Conference, and representatives of Pakistan, India, and Iran. The second phase would involve "representatives of the Afghan people."
- 06/24/81 -- AFP reported "heavy fighting" between Afghan rebels and government forces in a suburb of Kabul, requiring the summoning of government reinforcements from the provinces. AFP also reported that on June 17 resistance forces raided the Pul-i-Charki prison in Kabul and destroyed three tanks in a separate action in the Darulaman area, and that on June 16 government troops supported by Soviet aircraft attacked a rebel stronghold in Wardak province, causing "hundreds of wounded women and children" to flee to Kabul.
- Afghan resistance forces claimed to have shot down five Soviet MiG-21 fighters and to have captured a Soviet pilot during a two-week battle in Nangarhar province on Afghanistan's northeastern border with Pakistan.
- 06/15/81 -- At the conclusion of a two-day visit to Pakistan by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance

James L. Buckley, the U.S. and Pakistan jointly announced a six-year package of economic assistance, military sales credits and cash sales of military equipment "to support Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity." The agreement provides for cash sales of weapons during the year and a package of economic assistance and military sales credits totalling approximately \$3.0 billion over the subsequent five years. As part of the agreement, Pakistan is to acquire the advanced F-16 fighter bomber in quantities yet to be determined.

- 06/09/81 -- Afghan guerrillas reportedly attacked and set fire to a large Soviet airbase north of Kabul, destroying large quantities of ammunition and fuel and causing Soviet aircraft to scramble to escape the flames. Reportedly, the airbase at Bagram burned for two days. The attack was said to be one of several incidents corresponding to the anniversary of the execution, by Soviet forces, of Abdul Najib Kalakani, leader of a resistance group known as the Sama.
- 06/11/81 -- Following a two-month effort by the Soviets, the Central Committee of the Afghanistan's ruling party and the DRA Revolutionary Council to broaden the power base of the government, Soltan Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the DRA Council of Ministers, replaced Babrak Karmal as prime minister. Karmal retains the post of president. Although it had been speculated that the post would go to a member of the Khalq faction of the Communist movement, Keshtmand is closely linked to the dominant Parcham faction.
- 06/02/81 -- Widespread attacks on Soviet truck convoys were reported following Soviet air attacks on three mosques located on the strategic road linking Kabul with the Bagra air base. The Soviet destruction of the mosques, allegedly hiding places from which ambushes were launched, provoked a series of retaliations and counter-retaliations, including convoy attacks and a shooting spree along the highway by Soviet forces.
- 05/14/81 -- The Pakistan government refuted a May 13 broadcast by Radio Kabul alleging that it had deviated from a policy of seeking a solution to the Afghanistan situation through a political settlement.
- 05/13/81 -- AFP reported from Hong Kong that according to diplomatic sources the Afghan Revolutionary Council and the Communist Party Central Committee were to begin a five-day meeting on May 13 to choose a new prime minister.
- 05/12/81 -- Moscow Tass in an article headlined "Who Thwarts Settlement" quoted a Pravda article which criticized the alleged "frauds of the Imperialist propaganda services on the 'collapse of the Babrak Karmal regime.'" The Pravda article accused the United States of using the Afghanistan situation to create "a permanent seat of tension" and expand its zone of influence, and that "the Pakistani authorities, who increasingly bow to the



American diktat, are becoming accomplices to that dangerous game." The article went on to repeat the Soviet proposal to settle the question of "the situation around Afghanistan, both separately and in connection with questions of the Persian Gulf security."

- 05/06/91 -- The Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet following several days of testimony from witnesses, reported that an "Afghanistan Tribunal" declared the Soviet Union guilty of crimes against international law as a consequence of its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.
- 05/04/81 -- The May 4-10 issue of Strategy Week reported that the umbrella organization, Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, based in Peshawar, Pakistan, had split. Reportedly, three Islamic fundamentalist groups, including the Jamiat-i-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Harakat-i-Inqilabi, had formed a new front with the Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Hekmatyar group had split with the Alliance earlier.
- 05/03/81 -- AFP reported that following several days of fierce air and ground attacks, the Soviets managed to dislodge rebel groups that had held a large part of Qandahar for a month.
- 04/24/81 -- President Reagan announced at a cabinet meeting that he had ended the limitation on grain exports to the Soviet Union imposed by President Carter in January 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reportedly, the decision was strongly linked to pressure from domestic agricultural interests. During the 1980 Presidential election campaign, Mr. Reagan had pledged to lift the ban on grounds that it made farmers bear the full brunt of U.S. foreign policy. The President said that he delayed acting until now due to the Polish crisis and his concern not to send the "wrong signal" to the Soviet Union. The President insisted that the action implied no weakening of the American stand on Afghanistan, and that the United States would respond strongly to any future acts of aggression by the U.S.S.R. in any part of the world.
- AFP reported that Mohammed Siddiq Farhang, an advisor to Babrak Karmal who defeated in India in January 1981 after coming to New Delhi for medical treatment, confirmed that the Soviet Union had all but annexed the Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan bordering on China and Pakistan, and were building roads and upgrading military facilities.
- 04/23/81 -- Western diplomatic sources reported that in anticipation of the third anniversary of the Afghan revolution, Soviet and Afghan security forces had been put on a maximum alert. An AFP story datelined New Delhi also claimed

confirmation that Afghan rebel forces had shot and killed the deputy chief of the Afghan secret police, Brig. Ghulam Sakhi Atal, in Kabul on Apr. 13, as well as his brother and two other persons, and had killed the Commander of the Defense of Revolutionary Forces, Sharafuddin Sharaf, in Kabul on Apr. 17.

- In a Jalalabad speech reported by the Kabul Domestic Service (in Dari), Babrak Karmal sought to show that the DRA government was not antagonistic to Islam, rather, that the governments of Pakistan, China, Britain and the United States were enemies of Islam. He characterized the late Prime Minister Hafizollah Amin, of the rival Parcham faction, as "that CIA stooge," and stated that "when peace is restored in the country and the aggression against our country actually ceases, the limited military contingents of the USSR will return to their peace-loving country."

- 04/21/81 -- In a speech to Army troops in Jalalabad, reported by the Kabul Domestic Service (in Dari), Babrak Karmal defended the role of the U.S.S.R. and criticized Pakistan and Iran as undeclared enemies, along with China and the United States. He termed the Pakistan government a "terrorist regime brought to power by a coup," and implied that it lacked the legitimacy to negotiate with Kabul. He exhorted the Army to do its duty, stating that it was no longer the army of the old regime" and "can no longer just walk about in their military uniforms."
- 04/16/81 -- Radio Kabul reported that Babrak Karmal and Foreign Minister Mohammad Dost received and had a friendly talk with Javier Perez de Cueller, the personal representative of UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim charged with seeking a settlement of the Afghanistan issue.
- 03/13/81 -- AFP reported that a top aid to President Barbrak Karmal defected in New Delhi after arriving in India for medical care. Mohammed Siddiq Farhang, economic advisor to the Afghan president, criticized Karmal for failing to fulfill a personal promise, made at the time Farhang accepted the post, that the Soviets would be gone within one year.
- 03/09/81 -- President Reagan indicated to reporters that the U.S. would take into consideration requests for military assistance from Afghan resistance groups.
- 03/08/81 -- Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger indicated in a television interview that the United States would consider providing arms to Afghan resistance forces if asked, but that no decision was pending and all ramifications would have to be considered.
- 03/02/81 -- Three opponents of the Pakistan martial law government of President Zia-ul-Haq, calling themselves members of

the Al Zulfikar group, hijacked a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft and forced its diversion to Kabul. According to Pakistan sources the hijackers were openly welcomed by the son of the late Pakistani civilian prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and received additional weapons. The hijackers demanded the release of more than 90 alleged political prisoners and other conditions. Before departing Kabul for Damascus on Mar. 8, they shot and killed Tariq Rahim, a Pakistani diplomat and son of a senior army general. The Kabul authorities initially turned back a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft carrying a negotiating team, before allowing a later aircraft to pick up some hostages released by the hijackers. The Pakistan government strongly criticized the Afghan government for not taking forceful action and for seeming to be using the situation to extract diplomatic recognition of the Kabul government.

- 02/23/81 -- In his address to the 26th Soviet Communist Party Conference, President Leonid Brezhnev indicated a willingness to negotiate issues concerning the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan (but only "external" aspects, not "internal" affairs) with the Western countries, either as independent subjects or together.
- 02/19/81 -- Babrak Karmal arrived in Moscow for consultations and attendance at the 26th CPSU Congress.
- 02/13/81 -- The final declaration approved by the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference in New Delhi called for a political settlement of the Afghanistan crisis based on a withdrawal of foreign troops from that country. The Afghanistan government's Foreign Minister Mohammed Dost expressed disappointment at the outcome, including the failure even of a resolution amendment that would refer to the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Instead, the declaration mentioned only "Afghanistan." Thus, even though Afghanistan participated in the conference, the declaration implied a question of legitimacy of the present Soviet-backed government.
- 02/12/81 -- The Washington Post reported that UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had appointed a top aid, Javier Perez de Cuellar, a Peruvian diplomat, as special representative to work toward negotiations between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other states. The appointment followed separate meetings at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference between Waldheim and the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the head of the Iranian delegation.
- 02/11/81 -- In a surprisingly frank article in the Soviet publication Literary Gazette, a Soviet journalist warned an impending "catastrophe" if the present Afghan government did not modify its harsh attempts to transform Afghanistan and desist from indiscriminately harrasing

the "nomads," who, the author noted perceptively, the journal "represent a delicate, mobile, capillary structure penetrating all parts of the country," giving it cohesion. The article noted the danger of regionalism and tribalism and the need for the government to come to terms with these forces.

Significantly, the journal article characterized the army, not the ruling People's Democratic Party, as the critical national institution. Whether this recognition of the weaknesses of the government's position could be translated into a successful strategy remains to be seen. For one thing, it addresses only social issues and does not confront the critical issue of nationalist reaction against foreign intervention. Over the longer term the issue remains whether Afghanistan can in fact be pacified and remade, or whether the Soviets can only achieve limited military and geopolitical objectives.

- 02/10/81 -- Addressing the New Delhi meeting of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and support for international efforts to reach a political solution. He expressed special concern over the problem for Pakistan of sheltering 1.5 million Afghan refugees.
- 01/01/81 -- Agence France Presse reported that 200 conscripts held a demonstration in front of Army headquarters at Urgoon in Paktia province, demanding immediate release from the extensions of their 2-year military obligation.
- 12/10/80 -- During an address to the Indian Parliament in the course of a State visit, Soviet President Brezhnev proposed a five-point plan for dealing with the "dangerous" situation in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. President Brezhnev's proposal -- a reformulation of previous Soviet positions -- was aimed primarily at the U.S. naval buildup in the region. The Indian government was noncommittal regarding the plan.
- 12/08/80 -- In a welcoming banquet in honor of visiting Soviet President Brezhnev, Indian President N. Sanjiva Reddy noted India's opposition "to any form of intervention, covert or overt, by outside forces in the internal affairs of the region," and concern at "the upward spiral of competitive naval presence of nonlittoral states in the Indian Ocean" and "the acquisition or strengthening of bases, such as Diego Garcia."
- 11/20/80 -- The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved (111 to 22) a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.
- 11/17/80 -- In a speech before party members, Afghan President Babrak Karmal clarified that loyalty to the Soviet Union would be the main criterion for advancement

in the government and the ruling People's Democratic Party. Babrak also openly acknowledged that Soviet advisers and experts had permeated every level of the Afghan government.

- Soviet troops moved into a strategic corridor in northeast Afghanistan (the lightly inhabited 115-square mile Wakhan Corridor astride the Pamir Mountains), arousing Pakistani fears that the Soviet Union might annex the region and achieve a common frontier with the Indian subcontinent for the first time.

- 10/20/80 -- At the end of Babrak Karmal's visit to Moscow, the Soviet and Afghan heads of state issued a joint statement saying that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan only when all resistance to the Karmal regime has ended.
- 08/08/80 -- The State Department issued a report that it was "highly likely" that the Soviet Union had used chemical weapons against Afghan insurgents that were illegal under international agreements.
- 07/16/80 -- Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers ended two days of talks with no agreement over how to get the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan.
- 07/14/80 -- Non-communist diplomats arriving in New Delhi confirmed that Soviet forces in Afghanistan had intensified aerial and armored attacks on villages, launching at least 50 such raids in the last two weeks.
- 07/09/80 -- According to press reports, Muslim insurgents raided a Soviet military camp north of Kabul on July 6, reportedly causing heavy casualties; and a Soviet force of 400 tanks and armored personnel carriers, artillery, jet fighters and helicopter gunships struck back with three days of attacks in the region.
- 07/02/80 -- The Soviet Union rejected demands that it withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, emphasizing that it would do so only after all outside aid to anti-government rebels ceased and their camps in Pakistan were closed down. The statement, an unsigned editorial in Pravda, noted that the only acceptable political solution to the crisis was one that left the Soviet-supported Marxist government in Kabul firmly in power.
- 06/28/80 -- In an interview with the Washington Post, Georgi Arbatov, a non-voting member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and a senior authority on U.S.-Soviet relations, rejected proposals to replace the Karmal government, though he conceded its lack of popularity.
- 06/23/80 -- Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev said that

imperialist "interventionists" had suffered a "serious defeat" in Afghanistan. The New York Times reported his remarks before the Communist Party's Central Committee that Moscow would "further help Afghanistan build a new life and preserve the gains" of the revolution.

- 06/07/80 -- Travellers arriving in New Delhi from Kabul reported that a major battle between Afghan rebels and government and Soviet forces was taking place 20-30 miles northwest of the capital. Reportedly, Russian troops had cordoned off the city and several helicopters with many Russian casualties had been seen arriving at Kabul airport.
- 06/06/80 -- Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, arriving in Karachi from the first meeting, in Teheran, of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' standing committee on the Afghan crisis, revealed that the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, Habib Chatty, will hold talks in Kabul with the Babrak Karmal regime, the Soviet government, and Afghan rebel leaders.
- 06/04/81 -- In Tehran, the standing committee created by the May Islamic Conference to find a negotiated solution to the Afghan crisis convened for the first time.
- The BBC and Agence France Presse reported that fresh Soviet troops were being airlifted from the Soviet Union into Afghanistan for a major offensive against rebels massed along the Pakistani border.
- 06/03/80 -- UPI reported from New Delhi that American weapons appeared to be entering Afghanistan for the first time.
- 05/31/80 -- The Associated Press reported that Muslim rebels took control of central Afghanistan's Bamian Province and its capital city after a regular Afghan Army unit defected to the rebels. Soviet forces were said to be attempting to recapture the province.
- 05/29/80 -- A Reuters report, confirmed by UN officials in Pakistan, stated that heavy fighting between Afghan rebels and Soviet and government forces had broken out in Afghanistan's eastern Kunar Province.
- 05/28/80 -- In a Reuters' interview, Mahmood Barialai, brother of Babrak Karmal and a Central Committee member of the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, stated that his government was prepared to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops at two levels: internationally, with the United States, Soviet Union, and United Nations, and regionally, with Iran and Pakistan.
- 05/27/80 -- Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, speaking at a dinner for the visiting South Yemeni Prime Minister, welcomed Kabul's "concrete program" for a political settlement

and stated that such a settlement is "full possible" if the reasons for Soviet assistance are removed and outside interference in Afghan affairs ceases.

- Three days after the deadline for accepting invitations to the Moscow Olympics, the International Olympic Committee announced that 85 teams would participate, 36 would boycott, and 20 had failed to reply to their invitations.

- 05/25/80 -- Pravda, the official Communist Party daily, in a major article accused "the most reactionary Moslem circles" at the Islamic Conference of "railroading" a resolution on Afghanistan that constitutes open interference in Afghan affairs.
- 05/22/80 -- While reiterating previous resolutions condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the 11th Islamic Conference of foreign ministers ended with the establishment of a ministerial committee empowered to open negotiations with all powers involved in Afghanistan, including Moscow.
- 05/20/80 -- Leaders of major Afghan guerrilla groups called on Islamic nations to break diplomatic relations with Moscow and recognize them as the "sole legitimate representatives" of Afghanistan.
- 05/19/80 -- Speaking in Islamabad, Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Ghotbzadeh said that Iran would supply arms to Afghan rebels if negotiations failed to result in a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
- 05/18/80 -- Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq called on the United States to assume a more active role in the Persian Gulf Area, but said that his country would maintain a proposition of non-alignment between the United States and Soviet Union unless it became convinced that the United States was genuinely committed to blocking Soviet expansionism in that area of the world.
  - In Islamabad, six Afghan rebel leaders joined the Iranian delegation to the Islamic Conference.
  - Tass, the Soviet news agency, denounced the United States for its opposition to the proposals advanced by the Babrak Karmal regime on May 14. Tass charged the United States with conspiring with Peking against the Afghan regime and using events in Afghanistan as a pretext for aggression in the Persian Gulf area.
- 05/17/80 -- With 39 ministers in attendance, Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq opened the 11th Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Islamabad by denouncing the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.
- 05/16/80 -- In Vienna, U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met for three

hours for what was termed "an extensive and blunt" discussion of major differences in U.S.-Soviet relations that have arisen since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

- 05/15/80 -- Secretary of State Edmund Muskie dismissed as "cosmetic and not a meaningful proposal" Soviet-backed Afghan President Babrak Karmal's announcement that the question of "limited military contingents" can be discussed when "aggression and other forms of intervention" in Afghanistan have ceased.
- The New York Times reported that Pakistan had rejected any dialogue with the Soviet-backed Kabul regime until all Soviet forces had been withdrawn.
- The People's Republic of China denounced the Babrak Karmal regime's proposals for a political solution to the crisis as "creating pretexts" for continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.
- Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, citing Australian intelligence sources, said that the Soviet Union was building a major air base in southwest Afghanistan.
- 05/14/80 -- The Soviet-backed Afghan government for the first time offered to begin negotiations with Iran and Pakistan to set a timetable for a Soviet troop withdrawal, stipulating at the same time that the United States must guarantee non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.
- 05/11/80 -- The Washington Post, citing reports from the New Delhi, said that 70 Afghan students, many of them between the ages of 12 and 17, had been killed and hundreds wounded in demonstrations in Kabul which began April 21st.
- The Christian Science Monitor, citing reports from Kabul, revealed that Muslim guerrilla warfare has driven all Soviet and East European technical advisors out of Afghanistan, bringing to a halt major economic projects begun before the Soviet intervention in December.
- 05/09/80 -- Agence France Presse reported that fresh Soviet troops had landed in the Badakhshan Province near the Chinese border and were conducting operations against Afghan rebels.
- 05/06/80 -- Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq completed a four-day visit to Peking. Chinese reports stated that Pakistan and China had pledged to stand together to oppose "aggression, interference and hegemonism."
- 05/05/80 -- The Christian Science Monitor, citing reports by the Press Trust of India, said that Iran's Shiite clergy are assisting Afghan rebels with training and weapons.



The sources said that the Iranian government, however, was not directly involved.

- 05/01/80 -- Agence France Presse, citing travellers from Afghanistan, reported from New Delhi that at least 26 students, half of them girls, and a school principle were killed in Kabul between Apr. 27 and 29 during demonstrations against the regime. The travellers said at least 3,000 to 5,000 students took part in the street demonstrations.
- 04/29/80 -- The Washington Post, citing reports from New Delhi, said about 200 Afghan high school girls and women college students demonstrated on Apr. 27 in Kabul against the Soviet-backed regime. There were additional reports that students at a boys' school in Kabul had been killed while protesting the government's celebration of the second anniversary of the Marxist coup.
- 04/27/80 -- From Kabul, H.M. Kaul, a news correspondent of the Press Trust of India, reported that "highly placed sources" said the Soviet Union has deployed in Afghanistan medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
- 04/17/80 -- Tass, the Soviet news agency, reported that the Central Committee of the ruling People's Democratic Party in Afghanistan called for talks with Iran and Pakistan as part of a five-point plan to ensure peace and stability in the region. The proposals included bilateral talks with Iran and Pakistan to discuss normalizing relations and also called for a regional conference without conditions.
- In Salisbury, Zimbabwe, Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq attacked the United States for not playing "a much more significant role over the Soviet intervention" in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- 04/10/80 -- The Soviet-backed Afghan regime charged that U.S.-made chemical grenades have been used by Muslim rebels in Afghanistan.
- 04/07/80 -- UPI, citing Afghan rebel sources, reported a "major offensive" by Soviet troops in Afghanistan's Laghman province northeast of Kabul.
- 04/04/80 -- Tass, the Soviet press agency, announced that the Supreme Soviet Presidium ratified the treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union "on the conditions for the temporary stay of a limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan territory." Afghanistan's ruling Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers also approved the agreement. The new treaty was apparently signed during Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammed Dost's Mar. 13-14 visit to Moscow.

- 04/03/80 -- The Soviet news agency, Tass, reported that an American, Robert Lee, who was arrested in Kabul in February and accused of being a CIA agent, appeared on Afghan television to tell viewers that representatives of Western countries and China were attempting to "sabotage" the Afghan government. On April 2 a man identified as Lee was interviewed on Soviet television.
- Rebel sources in Peshawar, Pakistan reported a major drive by Soviet and Afghan government forces against Muslim insurgents in Mangahar province near the town of Jalalabad close to the Pakistani frontier.
- 01/28/80 -- In Islamabad, the foreign ministers of 34 Islamic nations condemned Soviet "military aggression" against Afghanistan, calling it a "flagrant violation" of international law. The delegates to the Islamic Conference also suspended Afghanistan membership in the organization and urged all Islamic states to withhold diplomatic recognition of the "illegal" regime. Unlike the UN resolution, the Islamic delegates mentioned the Soviet Union by name. The resolution also called for "nonparticipation" in the Moscow Olympics.
- 01/23/80 -- President Carter, in the State-of-the-Union message to the Congress, called the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a "grave threat" to the Middle East oilfields and warned that the United States would use "any means necessary, including military force" to repel an attack on the Persian Gulf.
- 01/21/80 -- The Commerce Department announced it had revoked all licenses for the export of computer spare parts for the Soviet Union's Kama River truck plant, built with the help of U.S. technology. Commerce Secretary Philip Klutznick said the action was taken because of indications that some of the Kama trucks had been used in Afghanistan.
- 01/05/80 -- The UN Security Council opened debate on the Soviet "invasion" of Afghanistan. Speaking for more than 50 nations that formally protested Moscow's actions, Egypt and Pakistan led the debate. A draft proposal drawn up by several Third World nations called for a resolution that would not name the Soviet Union specifically but condemned "foreign forces in Afghanistan."
- 01/04/80 -- President Carter announced a sharp reduction in shipments of American grain to the U.S.S.R., a temporary ban on sale of "high technology" items, a severe curtailment of Soviet fishing rights in American waters, and the deferral of most Soviet-American cultural exchange programs. These actions were in response to what Carter termed a "callous violation of international law" by the

## Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan.

- 01/02/80 -- Babrak Karmal, the new Afghan president installed by the Soviet Union, requested more defense aid from Moscow, Vietnam and Cuba to root "all enemies" of his government.
- The U.S. recalled its Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- 12/29/80 -- Soviet infantry divisions moved into Afghanistan, increasing the total number of combat troops to nearly 30,000.
- President Carter informed Soviet leader Brezhnev that continuation of the Soviet drive would have serious consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.
- 12/28/79 -- The Soviet Union confirmed that its troops were operating in support of the new Afghan government. Soviet news agency Tass justified the involvement under the terms of the Dec. 5, 1978, friendship treaty with Afghanistan.
- 12/27/79 -- President Amin was summarily overthrown by Soviet forces. Amin was summarily found guilty by a revolutionary tribunal of crimes against the Afghan people and was executed. Radio Kabul reported that "moral, financial, and military help" in the coup came from the Soviet Union.
- 12/26/79 -- The State Department accused the Soviet Union of "blatant military interference" in Afghanistan, citing a 150-plane airlift of troops and field equipment, which it said quadrupled the number of Soviet combat troops from 1,500 to 6,000.
- 12/13/79 -- U.S. concern about a growing Soviet role in Afghanistan was expressed to Soviet Charge d'Affaires Vasev by Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
- 09/12/79 -- President Mohammad Taraki was succeeded by Prime Minister Hafizulla Amin, apparently after a shootout in which an attempt by Taraki to kill Amin backfired.
- 02/14/79 -- U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was abducted at gunpoint and subsequently killed in a shootout between his captors and government security forces. Many questions remain about the identity and motives of his captors, the circumstances of his death and the role of Soviet advisors, who were seen apparently directing the assault on the room in the Kabul hotel in which Dubs was being held.
- 12/05/78 -- The Soviet and Afghan governments signed a 20-year treaty of "Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation." Each party agreed not to join any alliance directed against the other, and to consult

each other on all "major international issues" affecting their interests.

05/14/78 -- An interim constitution kept the existing legal system intact, but a military court was found "to try persons who have committed offenses against the Revolution."

04/27/78 - 04/28/78 -- A bloody revolution brought to power a Soviet-supported Marxist regime headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki.

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